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ABSTRACT
Bitcoin brings a new type of digital currency that does not rely on a central system to maintain
transactions. By benefiting from the concept of decentralized ledger, users who do not know or
trust each other can still conduct transactions in a peer-to-peer manner. Inspired by Bitcoin, other
cryptocurrencies were invented in recent years such as Ethereum, Dash, Zcash, Monero, Grin,
etc. Some of these focus on enhancing privacy for instance crypto note or systems that apply the
similar concept of encrypted notes used for transactions to enhance privacy (e.g., Zcash, Monero).
However, there are few mechanisms to support the exchange of privacy-enhanced notes or assets
on the chain, and at the same time preserving the privacy of the exchange operations. Existing
approaches for fair exchanges of assets with privacy mostly rely on off-chain/side-chain, escrow
or centralized services. Thus, we propose a solution that supports oblivious and privacy-protected
fair exchange of crypto notes or privacy enhanced crypto assets. The technology is demonstrated
by extending zero-knowledge based crypto notes. To address “privacy” and “multi-currency”, we
build a new zero-knowledge proving system and extend note format with new property to represent
various types of tokenized assets or cryptocurrencies. By extending the payment protocol, exchange
operations are realized through privacy enhanced transactions (e.g., shielded transactions). Based on
the possible scenarios during the exchange operation, we add new constraints and conditions to the
zero-knowledge proving system used for validating transactions publicly.
Keywords blockchain, swap, fair exchange, privacy
1 Introduction
Cryptocurrency systems based on decentralized ledgers, require each participant to keep a local copy of the transaction
history, in order to prevent double-spending without relying on a centralized party. This design however exposes users
to privacy concerns, as all transaction information becomes publicly available [1].
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To address this problem, several solutions (e.g., Cryptonote [2], Zcash [3], Monero [4], and Grin [5]), proposed the use
of encrypted notes (or UTXOs), and focus on privacy issues at the individual payment transaction level, by preventing
the disclosure of payment related information, e.g., the recipient wallet address, and the amount of cryptocurrency
transferred. However, privacy preserving or oblivious fair exchange of crypto coins/assets, which is essential for a
thriving ecosystem, have been so far largely ignored.
In this paper, we develop a unified framework to support both privacy enhanced payment transactions and a fair exchange
of crypto assets without using centralized mixing services, escrow based or off-chain/site-chain approaches [6]. By
exchange we mean giving a certain digital asset and receiving another asset in return. The giving and the receiving can
be of identical types, e.g., Alice exchanges a ten-dollar note in several one-dollar notes with Bob. They can also be
different types of digital assets, for instance, the exchange between one type of crypto asset with another type of crypto
asset. Such exchanges are essential for ICOs, as investors need to buy a newly created currency using other currencies.
In 2018 alone, there were more than 1,000 ICOs, with a total value of exchange transactions of about 8 billion USD 1
More specifically, we propose a ledger-based multi-asset system, designed to support both the private exchange (swap)
of crypto-assets and regular spending operations. Our solution aims at satisfying several requirements. First, the
exchange should to be atomic, i.e., either both or none of the transfers are executed. Second, the system should support
exchange between different types of assets, which we call private notes. Third, the exchange needs to be private,
i.e., information posted on the blockchain should not leak the identities of the parties involved in the exchange, or
the nature of the exchange (e.g., types and amount of assets, status of the success of the exchange). The proposed
scheme introduces the concept of sibling note and negative value to allow the linkage of discrete steps in an exchange to
guarantee the fairness, and leverages zero-knowledge proof to hide information of exchange transactions while allowing
the public to verify the validity. Since a different zero-knowledge proof is required for each step in the exchange, we
also utilize a mechanism to merge different types of zero-knowledge proofs into a single format so an adversary cannot
learn even the type information of a step in the exchange process.
In summary, the paper provides the following contributions:
• We develop a unified and formal framework of privacy preserving exchanges and payment transactions of
crypto assets on a decentralized ledger that satisfies security and privacy requirements;
• We propose a concrete construction of privacy-preserving asset exchange scheme that supports multiple types
of crypto assets and meets the formal definitions; and
• We describe and discuss implementation details of the designed scheme using zero-knowledge based cryp-
tocurrency as an exemplary platform.
2 Related Work
In this section, we briefly review related works. Typically, the exchange of privacy coins can be completed using a
centralized intermediary or escrow service provider. The escrow services are basically third party implementations
which allow for fast off-chain completion of the transaction and it has been also implemented in TumbleBit [7].
Information exchange. For fair information exchange, Alice and Bob exchange their secret information in a fair way:
either they learn each others secret at the same time, or they both keep their secrets undisclosed. It has been proved
that this is not feasible without the involvement of a third party [8], and some works have been done on utilizing the
blockchain as a broker to facilitate such exchange [9]. An important difference between information exchange and
crypto-asset exchange is that the latter requires the transfer of ownership, which is more than fair information exchange.
For example,
• If Alice and Bob exchange information of their assets, they still own their own assets and an extra protocol is
required to enforce the transferring of ownership;
• If Alice and Bob exchange information that controls the assets (e.g., private key to spend the asset), they are
facing a racing condition as both of them still hold their own information after the exchange.
Furthermore, most information exchange methods do not consider the requirement of privacy. Without loss of generality,
in this paper, crypto assets include cryptocurrencies and tokenized assets. Exchange can occur between any type
of digital assets secured by a distributed ledger based transaction system. Further, we assume an environment of
privacy assets, for instance, systems based on encrypted notes. The notes and payment transactions are protected with
privacy enhancement such as zero-knowledge proving protocols. Towards these objectives, we extend data models and
1https://www.icodata.io/stats/2018.
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protocols of existing privacy coin schemes, for instance, Zcash/Zerocoin by introducing asset types as an extension
to note format for supporting multiple asset types. In addition, we modify the data models and transaction protocols
to support oblivious and fair exchanges of crypto notes between users. Our goal is to enable the exchange of privacy
enhanced crypto assets with the following main characteristics: exchange operations are atomic; transactions are
publicly verifiable; they are oblivious without disclosing information of the exchange operations.
Zero knowledge execution (ZEXE). Zero knowledge can protect the privacy from not only the transaction information
but also computation (if it exists). Sean Bowe et al. propose a decentralized-ledger-based system that allows transactions
to hide all information about the offline computations but any node can still validate the computations even without
whole details [10]. A use case of cryptocurrency exchange is mentioned in their research. It leverages ZEXE and
supports exchange. However, the system needs to execute a script to verify a preset list of conditions before sending
the notes. In another word, it has to wait until it gets expected results from the commitment pool. In contrast, in our
approach, notes are sent right away. It reduces the delay of transactions. And we have seen a lot of implementations of
the Zero-Knowledge proof in different areas like in the Privacy preserving Auditing [11]. There also have been research
on having a confidential asserts, scheme where a single node can handle multiple assert types [12]
Decentralized exchange. Zcash [3] and Zcoin [13] represent a few of the implementations of the zero-Knowledge
proof for privacy where connection between the sender and receivers is cut off. It leaves no trails of both the entities
involved in payment transaction [3]. In recent times, we have seen several exchange systems built over the blockchain
that somewhere in their systems implements the zero-knowledge proof. TEX [14] is one of the proposed exchange
systems which claims to be better than the existing decentralized exchanges (DEX). The proposed TEX system operates
in two layers and proposes to execute a trade without the requirement of withholding assets. Other than the exchange
mentioned above we have seen a rising number of exchange systems being introduced, and one of them is the Zerocoin
Decentralized Exchange (ZDex) which is built over the PIVX platform which in turn, in theory, is a cold fork of the
Dash. In its current state, it can support the Bitcoin cash, Litecoin, Dash, Zcash. However, one of the significant
drawbacks in this implementation that we have gone ahead and addressed in our approach is that ZDex in its current
state doesn’t support atomic swap of digital assets. There are also works on utilizing trusted computing technology to
improve the performance and security of smart contract [15], which can be leveraged to implement exchange or even
provide privacy protection. However, this type of approaches rely on the trust of the hardware and the vendor behind.
3 Overview of Publicly Verifiable Oblivious and Fair Exchange
In this section, we provide an overview of the proposed privacy preserving exchange mechanism on a decentralized
ledger.
3.1 Problem Statement
At a high level, the system is aimed to meet the following requirements.
• Decentralized privacy ledger with multi-asset support (for instance zero-knowledge based system with the
capability to support multiple types of coins, currencies, or tokens).
• Support of privacy protected payment transactions similar to Zcash/Zerocoin (e.g., shielded to shielded
payment transactions).
• Publicly verifiable means that the public should be able to verify the validity of all transactions including
privacy protected payment transactions.
• Fair exchange. Fairness means that an asset exchange operation between two users is atomic. Although the
operation may involve multiple payment steps. At the end, either the exchange succeeds with ownership swap
of each participant′s digital asset, or the operation terminates so that each participant still keeps his/her own
asset before the exchange.
• Oblivious exchange. Oblivious means that all transactions (both payment transactions and exchange transac-
tions) recorded on the ledger and verified by the public should appear to be identical (indistinguishable from
one another) and reveal no information or knowledge about the exchange operation including: the presence of
exchange operation, users/accounts involved in the exchange, types of assets and corresponding amounts in
the exchange. This means that exchange transactions should be hidden from the shielded payment transactions.
Based on history of transactions, an adversary should not be able to separate transactions for fulling exchanges
from other shielded payment transactions.
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Alice Completes Exchange
Input Notes Output Notes
Alice Initiates Exchange Bob Spends
Input Notes Output Notes Input Notes Output Notes
Shielded payment transaction Shielded payment transaction Shielded payment transaction
Alice Cancels ExchangeNo Response 
from Bob
Input Notes Output Notes
Shielded payment transaction
Figure 1: Example transaction sequence between Alice and Bob to complete exchange of assets.
• Unified transaction system for both payment and exchange operation. The system should not use separate
protocols or algorithms that are unique for payment transactions and exchange operations. All transactions
should be verified using the same mechanism and an identical procedure.
We assume that there are more than one type of crypto assets in the system and owners of two different types of assets,
Alice and Bob, who do not fully trust each other decide to exchange the ownership of digital assets (e.g., privacy coins,
privacy tokens) on the decentralized ledger.
If privacy is not a concern, we can easily implement a fair exchange operation using a smart contract, and the distributed
ledger can guarantee the atomic property of the operation, i.e., either the operation succeeds that Alice and Bob get the
other’s digital asset, or the operation fails that each one still keeps his/her own assets. However, such an approach does
not provide any privacy protection. Every node in the system can see the exchange information.
It is worth mentioning that all transactions involved in an exchange operation should be publicly verifiable (verified on
the chain by nodes of the ledger network using consensus) and all transactions should be oblivious. In other words, all
transactions, regardless of their nature (e.g., payment transactions, different steps of exchange operations) should be
indistinguishable to the public who verify them. These requirements exclude alternatives such as setting an off-chain
payment channel for exchange.
To simplify discussions and experiments, we use zero-knowledge proof based privacy coin (e.g., Zcash, Zerocoin) as
baseline design. We extend the privacy coin data models and proving systems to support multiple assets, and oblivious
fair exchange. Exchange is realized by a pre-defined sequence of privacy protected (shielded) payment transactions.
3.2 Zero Knowledge Proof based Currencies
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a protocol in which a prover can convince a verifier that some statement holds
without revealing any information. Roughly speaking, a zero-knowledge proof involves two parties, the prover and the
verifier. For a statement, the prover can generate a proof to convince the verifier of the correctness of the statement.
In this process, the verifier cannot learn anything except the fact that the statement is true (zero-knowledge feature).
Zero-knowledge proofs can be either interactive or non-interactive. Interactive zero-knowledge proofs [16, 17] requires
the prover to communicate with the verifier over multiple rounds to finish the proof. Non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs (NIZK) [18–20] do not require multiple rounds of interactions between prover and verifier and are more suitable
for scenarios where it is difficult for these parties to be online at the same time.
An important tool related to NIZK is zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARK) [21–
23]. We refer the readers to [22] for a formal definition of zk-SNARK. Leveraging practical ZK-SNARK, Zcash
implements a Decentralized Payment System with strong protection of transaction integrity and anonymity built from
collision-resistant hash (CRH) functions, commitment schemes, and pseudo-random functions. When a crypto-note
(UTXO) is spent, the spender needs to create a zero-knowledge proof that there is a corresponding note commitment in
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the pool of commitments without disclosing which one it is. The proof also shows that the transaction is consistent and
that the user knows all the secret keys, without revealing any additional information.
3.3 An Example of Exchange Operation
The proposed oblivious and fair exchange scheme extends Zcash data models, for instance, crypto-note definition,
referred as a note for simplification, and the payment protocol. This subsection describes the high-level design concept
with a concrete exchange example.
To support multiple assets, the note format is expanded to include a new integer attribute that specifies the types of
digital assets (e.g., coins, tokens). Here we use colors to represent different types of assets (e.g., red coin, green coin,
yellow coin). In addition, there are two types of notes, called primary note and sibling note. In Figure 1, note with
a green surrounding box is a primary note; and note with a red surrounding box is a sibling note. A sibling note is
uniquely associated with a primary note. Each payment transaction includes input notes and output notes where input
notes are consumed and output notes are created. A primary note can be consumed by itself in a payment transaction
while the associated sibling note can only be consumed either after the primary note has been consumed already in the
past or together with the primary note in a transaction.
Furthermore, each note contains a debt part (the type of asset and amount) which requires that when the note is
consumed in a transaction, the debt part has to be canceled out by additional note with sufficient value that matches
with the debt (both asset type and amount). For instance, if a note contains a debt of five red coins, when it is consumed
(spent), the user has to mix it with a note containing at least five red coins as inputs.
Assume that Alice wants to exchange five green coins with Bob′s three yellow coins. The sequence of actions may be
the following:
• Alice initiates the exchange operation by converting her assets into a pair of notes. In the first transaction, she
provides two input notes (one with three green coins and one with two green coins). The transaction outputs
two notes, one primary note with five green coins and three yellow coins as debt; and a sibling note with three
yellow coins. Nodes in the ledger network verify the transactions and store the notes on the ledger.
• The primary note is encrypted and shared between Alice and Bob. Either Alice or Bob can spend the primary
note.
• If Bob wants to complete the exchange, he issues a new transaction using the received primary note from Alice
and one of his notes as inputs. In this case, his input note contains four yellow coins. The transaction produces
two output notes, one with five green coins and the second one with one yellow coin (after canceling the three
yellow coin debt embedded in the note received from Alice).
• After Bob spends the note sent by Alice, Alice can spend the associated sibling note that contains three yellow
coins, which completes the exchange.
• In case that Bob does not spend the note received from Alice within a bounded time limit, Alice can cancel
the exchange by creating a new transaction that spends both the primary note and the associated sibling note,
which cancels out the three yellow coin debt. The output notes will contain the five green coins that she puts
in the primary note shared with Bob. As a result, the exchange is terminated. Bob can no longer spend the
primary note received from Alice.
Here in this section, we skip discussions on how the protocol can protect the privacy of each transaction step, ensure
fairness and exchange atomicity, and prevent cheating by either Alice or Bob. Details of the protocol design and
verification algorithms, as well as security analyses, are provided in the following sections of the paper.
4 Definition of Oblivious Multi-Asset Protocol (OMAP) with Fair Exchange Support
The notations of OMAP are based on extending the notations in Zcash [13, 24]. In this paper, for simplification, we
apply zk-SNARK and original Zcash design [13, 24] to achieve exemplary implementation of OMAP. However, it is
worthwhile pointing out that it is possible to realize OMAP using other zero-knowledge proof systems, for instance,
zk-STARK [25], bulletproof [26], or alternative approaches such as [27]. Discussion applying these different systems
is orthogonal to the scope of this work, which focuses primarily on protocol design of privacy preserving multi-asset
transaction and exchange system.
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Note format and example
Type of note:
0: primary note.
1: sibling note.
Primary:
Type of coin/token, and amount.
Debt:
Type of coin/token, and amount.
Block threshold: 
Block height time limit.
Unique number: 
For a pair of notes, 
primary and its sibling.
Figure 2: Private note structure.
4.1 Data Models
We extend the definition and data format of Zerocoin and Zcash. The notations are based on Zcash specifications. CRH
stands for collision-resistant hash algorithm and PRF stands for pseudo-random function.
Multi asset ledger: There is a multi-asset ledger, LOMAP , which records a sequence of transactions in append-only
mode. The ledger supports multiple types of tokens or assets using extended note format, described below. The
ledger comprises ordered blocks created from a genesis block under a consensus mechanism. Each block has a block
height. Further, we assume that blocks are generated with a relatively constant speed. Details of consensus mechanism
and block generation can be either based on or follow Zcash design. Although our experiments are based on Zcash
implementation, OMAP and LOMAP can be adapted to any distributed ledger based systems such as one based on PoS.
Public parameters: In the case of the experiments in this paper, the system uses the same set of public parameters pp
as Zcash design. They are generated either by a trusted party at the beginning or through a Multi-Party Computation
ceremony [28, 29]. If OMAP is implemented over a proving system that doesn’t require trusted setup, the public
parameters can be based on common public strings appropriate for the proving system.
Payment address and note format: In this work, we use the same design of payment address pair (ask, apk) where
ask is used as spending key. For receiving shielded payment, a user needs to scan ledger LOMAP using ask. The
algorithm is similar to the one described in Zcash blockchain scanning. For each type of asset or token, there is a vpub.
In this experimental implementation, the value is stored in levelDB.
An OMAP note, n, is similar to Zcash note with extensions to support multiple assets and oblivious exchange. A note is
associated with the following attributes:
• apk: spending key
• s: type of note (primary or sibling note)
• color1: color of primary coin (type of asset)
• v1: value of primary coin
• color2: color of debt coin (type of asset)
• v2: debt coin amount
• bt: block height threshold
• ρ: used to compute nullifier (disclosed to the public after spending)
• γ: trapdoor
• S: unique value for a pair of matching notes
• cm: note commitment
Figure 2 shows an example note. Attributes including apk, ρ, γ, cm are the same as defined by Zcash design. For each
note, attribute s specifies the type of note (primary or sibling). For simplifying the discussion, we refer the type of asset
as color, for instance, black coin, red coin, which means that black coin and red coin represent different types of assets.
The type and amount of primary asset are represented as: color1 and v1. Size of color field determines the maximum
number of assets supported by OMAP. For each note, there is a second pair of asset type and the amount that represent
6
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== =
Sibling note
Primary note
Figure 3: A pair of primary and sibling notes.
comm comm comm comm nullifier nullifier comm comm
RT Layer 0
Layer h …
Figure 4: Combined Merkle tree for storing note commitments and nullifiers. Zero knowledge proof is used to show
that for any leaf node, there is a path to the root.
debt embedded in a note, (color2, v2). When both color2 and v2 are zero, it means that the note is a regular note. When
both color2 and v2 are not zero, it means that when the note is spent, it has to be paired with a note with primary asset
type matching with color2 and the amount greater than or equal with v2. The second pair (color2, v2) is introduced for
the purpose to support the atomic exchange of different types of assets between two OMAP users.
Attribute bt is a block height threshold, which is used for setting a time limit of asset exchange or swap. It is a threshold
value that can be configured to decide when the counterparty in exchange has to spend a received note in order to
move forward to the next step. When a user initiates an exchange, the user will create a note pair, see example in
Figure 3. One note has s set as zero (primary note) and the second one with s set to 1 (sibling note). Attribute S is
a unique value for each pair of matching notes, which means that a primary note and its sibling note share the same
value S. Calculation of S is based on a CHR with a unique random input computed from the input notes (specific to a
transaction). In addition, for each pair of notes (primary and its sibling), the value of bt needs to be the same; color1,2 =
color2,1 ∧ v1,2 = v2,1; and v2, 2 = 0.
When a note is spent, a nullifier value, nf , will be created using attribute ρ as input where nf is determined by
PRFnfask(ρ). OMAP enforces that nullifiers must be unique in order to prevent double-spending. In addition, uniqueness
of nullifiers are used to support the atomic exchange of assets (see section 5).
Note commitment and nullifier Tree. OMAP uses incremental Merkle tree of fixed depth for note commitments and
nullifiers. Different from Zcash where nullifiers are kept only for preventing double-spending, OMAP maintains a
joint Merkle tree, M , that includes both note commitments and nullifiers. Alternatively, there could be separate note
commitment tree and nullifier tree so that there will be two roots, one for note commitment tree and the second one for
nullifier tree. In this work, we assume that the two trees are combined.
Each commit or nullifier has a (path, pos) where pos is position in the tree. Leaf node MMerkleDepthi is in the tree with
given root rt = M00 , where M ∈ (cm, nf).
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4.2 Algorithms
An Oblivious Multi-Asset Protocol with Exchange Support consists of algorithms (SetupOMAP, CreateAddrOMAP,
MintOMAP, JoinsplitOMAP, VerifyOMAP, ReceiveOMAP) defined below.
SetupOMAP(1λ): Based on security parameter λ, it creates public parameters ppOMAP defined as (pkJoinSplit, vkJoinSplit,
ppenc, ppsig) where pkJoinSplit and vkJoinSplit are a pair of proving and verifying key for JoinSplit transactions (also see
section 5).
CreateAddrOMAP(ppOMAP): Given public parameters ppOMAP, it creates payment address pair (ask, apk) where ask is
used as spending key. A user can create arbitrary number of such address pairs.
MintOMAP(ppOMAP, n, color, v, pi, LOMAP): Given public parameters ppOMAP, a note n, asset type color, value v, a proof
pi, it appends note n to the ledger LOMAP , or output ⊥.
JoinSplitOMAP(ppOMAP, nold1 , nold2 , aoldsk,1, a
old
sk,2, color
old
pub, v
old
pub, LOMAP): It takes as inputs, public parameters ppOMAP,
Merkle tree root rt, two input notes nold1 and n
old
2 , the corresponding spending keys a
old
sk,1 and a
old
sk,2, two output
addresses anewpk,1 and a
new
pk,2, public value and asset type (color), color
old
pub and v
old
pub, ledger LOMAP, it creates two output
notes, nnew1 and n
new
2 , and a transaction trJoinSplit.
VerifyOMAP(ppOMAP, nnew1 , nnew2 , trJoinSplit, LOMAP): Given public parameters ppOMAP, Merkle tree root rt, a JoinSplit
transaction trJoinSplit, two notes nnew1 and n
new
2 , and ledger LOMAP, it appends trJoinSplit, n
new
1 and n
new
2 to the ledger, or
output ⊥.
ReceiveOMAP(ppOMAP, rt, LOMAP): Given public parameters ppOMAP, Merkle tree root rt, recipient key pair (ask, apk),
and the ledger LOMAP, it outputs received note nnew, or output ⊥.
Note that in this work, we restrict to cases of two input notes and two output notes. Spending cases of more than two
input notes or two output notes can be reduced to transactions with two notes as input and output, subject of future
extension and research. Similar to the Zcash design, input note or output note can be dummy note (without associated
note commitment). In the case of dummy note, the asset type is zero.
Remark : Refer to [24] for a complete description of notations in the zero-knowledge proving system used by Zcash.
The description is based on extending Zcash note format and operations. Here we focus on algorithms and definitions
that are extended or modified to support oblivious and fair exchange through trJoinSplit transactions. Definitions that
are not changed can be found in the original Zcash publication and implementation specification.
5 OMAP Protocol
5.1 Preliminary
The protocol is built by extending the design of zero-knowledge based privacy payment system such as Zcash. These
privacy oriented cryptocurrencies apply zero-knowledge proving system as the underlying building block to protect
privacy. A zero-knowledge proving system is a cryptography protocol that allows proving a particular claim/statement,
dependent on two input datasets, public and witness, without disclosing information about the witness input other than
that included in the claim/statement,
A zero-knowledge instance ZK defines [24]:
• ZK proving key, ZK.ProvingKey - pk
• ZK verifying key, ZK.VerifyingKey - vk
• a key generation algorithm for creating pk and vk
• public input, ZK.PublicInput - χ
• witness, ZK.Witness - ω
• proofs ZK.Proof - pi
• set of satisfying inputs where ZK.SatisfyingInputs ∈ ZK.PublicInput × ZK.Witness
• a proving algorithm ZK.Prove that produces ZK.Proof from pk and ZK.SatisfyingInputs
• a verifying algorithm ZK.Verify that accepts or rejects a statement based on vk × ZK.PublicInput × ZK.Proof
8
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A zero-knowledge proving system needs to satisfy the following security requirements:
Completeness: for security parameter λ, a F, arithmetic circuit C, and any (χ, ω) ∈ R (satisfying inputs), honest prover
can convince the verifier with probability 1− negl(λ).
Succinctness: honestly generated proof pi has On(1) bits and Verify(vk, χ, pi) runs in the Oλ(|χ|).
Proof-of-knowledge: If the verifier accepts a proof output by a bounded prover, then the prover knows witness for the
given statement.
5.2 Transaction Algorithms
For completeness, this subsection lists the main algorithms. Additional details and definitions can be found in Zcash
specification. The main extensions are related to JoinSplit transaction. In addition to one-way payment (shielded to the
shielded transaction of Zcash note), JoinSplit is expanded to support additional spending/transaction cases for achieving
atomic and oblivious exchange of different types of assets (notes). As described earlier, the design is extended to
support multiple types of assets such as a variety of coins or tokens.
SetupOMAP : It takes 1λ as security parameter and outputs public parameters ppOMAP as following.
• compute CJoinSplit at security parameter λ
• compute (pkJoinSplit, vkJoinSplit) = KeyGen(1λ, CJoinSplit)
• create ppenc = Genc(1λ)
• create ppsig = Gsig(1λ)
• output ppOMAP = (pkJoinSplit, vkJoinSplit, ppenc, ppsig)
pkJoinSplit and vkJoinSplit are a pair of proving and verifying key for JoinSplit transactions. In the design and
experiment described in this paper, SetupOMAP follows the same Zcash algorithm for constructing public parameters.
CreateAddrOMAP : It takes public parameters ppOMAP as input and creates a pair of transmission key (apk, pkenc)
and receiving key (apk, skenc) where a note sent to a recipient is encrypted using pkenc and it is retrieved by the
recipient from the ledger using skenc.
In case of initializing the first JoinSplit transaction for an exchange operation, sender and recipient share the same
spending key ask for spending the primary note. In this case, ask can be created from a shared secret between the
sender who initiates the exchange and recipient, for instance ask = PRF sharedask (sharedsecret||hsig) where hsig =
CRH(nfold1 , nf
old
2 , pksig) and PRF can be SHA-256.
MintOMAP : It takes public parameters ppOMAP , public address pair (apk, pkenc), pi, asset color, value v where color
∈ (1, ..., colormax) and v ∈ (0, ..., vmax). It appends note n to the ledger LOMAP , or output ⊥. This algorithm is used
to mint notes of different asset types based on the public values (each asset type and amount) and put the notes on
LOMAP .
JoinSplitOMAP : It takes as inputs, public parameters ppOMAP , Merkle tree root rt, two input notes nold1 and nold2 ,
the corresponding spending keys aoldsk,1 and a
old
sk,2, two output addresses a
new
pk,1 and a
new
pk,2, public value and asset type
(color), coloroldpub and v
old
pub, ledger LOMAP . it creates two output notes, n
new
1 and n
new
2 , and a transaction trJoinSplit.
To support asset exchange, there are different spending cases for JoinSplit transaction. Combination of these cases can
be applied to achieve atomic exchange of assets between users. The list of JoinSplit spending cases and details are
described in the following section. Here we focus on operations and procedures common to all the spending cases.
These include:
• for each input note, compute nullifier nfoldi = PRFnfoldaoldsk,i (ρ
old
i ) = SHA-256(a
old
sk,i‖ρoldi )
• create signature key pair (pksig, sksig) = κsig(ppsig) where signature scheme is sUF-CMA (e.g., Ed25519)
• compute hsig = CRH(nfold1 , nfold2 , pksig)
• for each new note, sample γnewi R←− COMM.Trapdoor
• set ρnewi = PRF ρϕ(i, hsig) = SHA-256(i‖ϕ‖hsig)
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• compute note commitment cmnewi = COMMsrnewi (anewpk,i , snewi , colornewi,1 , vnewi,1 , colornewi,2 , vnewi,2 , btnewi ,
ρnewi , γ
new
i , hsig) where COMM can be SHA-256
• set new note as nnewi = (anewpk,i , snewi , colornewi,1 , vnewi,1 , colornewi,2 , vnewi,2 , btnewi , ρnewi , γnewi , hsig , cmnewi )
• compute old note spending signature hi= PRF pkaoldsk,i(i||hsig)
• encrypt new note as Nenc,newi = Eenc(pknewenc,i, nnewi )
• set public input χ = (rt, nfold1 , nfold2 , cmnew1 , cmnew2 , voldpub,color, vnewpub,color, blockn, hsig , h1, h2)
• set witness ω = (path1, path2, pos1, pos2, nold1 , nold2 , aoldsk,1, aoldsk,2, ϕ, dummyold1 , dummyold2 , nnew1 , nnew2 ,
path3, pos3, nold3 , a
old
sk,3, path4, pos4, nf
old
3 )
• compute proof piJoinSplit = Prove(pkJoinSplit, χ, ω)
• set transaction message m = (χ, piJoinSplit, info, Nenc,new1 , Nenc,new2 )
• set message signature δ = Ssig(sksig,m)
• txJoinSplit = (rt, nfold1 , nfold2 , cmnew1 , cmnew2 , colornewpub , vnewpub , info, ∗) where
• * = (pksig , h1, h2, piJoinSplit, Nenc,new1 , Nenc,new2 , δ)
In ω, the data fields are defined as:
• path1..Nold and pos1..Nold , N=1 or 2: Merkle tree paths of old notes
• nold1..Nold , N=1 or 2: old notes
• aoldsk,1..Nold , N=1 or 2: old note spending key
• ϕ: random seed
• dummyold1..Nold : old note is dummy note or not
• nnew1..Nnew : new notes
• path3 and pos3: Merkle tree path and position of associated note with one of the old notes (primary and
sibling pair)
• nold3 : associated note with one of the old notes (primary and sibling pair)
• aoldsk,3: spending key of the associated note (primary and sibling pair)
• path4 and pos4: Merkle tree path and position of associated note nullifier (primary and sibling pair)
• nfold3 : associated note nullifier (primary and sibling pair)
When generating piJoinSplit, the circuit verifies spending case specific constraints that will be described in the next
section. There are checks common to all JoinSplit spending cases including:
• Merkle path validity: (pathi, posi) valid tree path from NoteCommit (noldi ) to rt
• Nullifier integrity: nfoldi = PRFnfoldaoldsk,i (ρ
old
i )
• Spending key validity: aoldpki = PRF addraoldsk,i (0)
• Uniqueness of ρnewi : ρnewi = PRF ρϕ(i, hsig)
• Note commit: cmnewi = NoteCommit(nnewi )
V erifyOMAP : It takes public parameters ppOMAP , Merkle tree root rt, a JoinSplit transaction trJoinSplit, two notes
nnew1 and n
new
2 , and ledger LOMAP , it appends trJoinSplit, n
new
1 and n
new
2 to the ledger, or output ⊥. The algorithm
does the following:
• parse trJoinSplit
• b1←V erify(vkJoinSplit, χ, piJoinSplit)
• b2←νsig(pksig,m, δ)
• output ⊥ if any of the following is true:
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Initialize Exchange by 
AliceExchange 
Started JoinSplit transaction.Spending-
Case 1
Cancel by Alice
JoinSplit transaction.Spending-
Case 2
Exchange 
Terminated
Counterparty (Bob) 
Spends 
JoinSplit transaction.Spending-
Case 3
Initiator (Alice) Spends
JoinSplit transaction.Spending-
Case 5 or 4
Exchange 
Completed
Figure 5: Workflow of privacy-preserving fair exchange of private assets. The fair exchange is achieved through shielded
JoinSplit transactions. Alice initializes the process. She can cancel the operation (depending on time constraints).
After Bob takes action toward completion, Alice can issue a transaction to complete the exchange. If Bob does not
respond with a transaction, Alice can cancel the exchange operation and recover her notes. All transactions are shielded
transactions of privacy notes.
– b1 ∧ b2 is false
– nfold1 or nfold2 appears on LOMAP
– nfold1 = nfold2
– Merkle root rt not on LOMAP
– hsig doesn’t match with CRH(nfold1 , nfold2 , pksig)
ReceiveOMAP : Given public parameters ppOMAP , Merkle tree root rt, recipient key pair (ask, apk), and the ledger
LOMAP , it outputs received note nnew, or output ⊥. The algorithm follows Zcash design. It scans the ledger and
outputs received note for each JoinSplit transaction.
6 Design of Privacy Preserving Fair Exchange
In this section, we provide the details of a concrete privacy preserving exchange scheme implemented over ZK based
privacy multi-asset ledger. A fair exchange between users is achieved through multiple JoinSplit payment transactions
of private assets.
6.1 Overview of Transaction Workflow
Asset exchange is achieved using a sequence of extended JoinSplit transactions. The scheme is designed to ensure
fairness, correctness, and privacy of the exchange operations. Fairness means that the entire operation (sequence of
JoinSplit payments) satisfies atomicity. Correctness requires that the system should maintain a balance of assets during
exchange transactions. Privacy means that all JoinSplit transactions recorded on the ledger and verified by the public
should appear to be identical (indistinguishable from one another) and reveal no information about the exchange (e.g.,
users involved, asset types, amounts, exchange status).
Atomicity is critical for the privacy-preserving exchange operation. It does not mean that the exchange of assets needs
to be completed using one step. It requires the exchange/swap to be fair, i.e., at the end of the exchange, the operation
either fails and two parties get their notes back, or succeeds that each party gets the other’s note. Figure 5 illustrates
the workflow of an exchange, where each step involves a shielded JoinSplit transaction. The flow may be affected by
actions of the participating parties. Further details of each transaction case are described next.
6.2 Transactions for Supporting Exchange
OMAP achieves exchange of assets with privacy between two parties using JoinSplit transactions. In order to support
fair exchange, the JoinSplit transaction protocol described in Zcash design is extended with new spending scenarios.
Accordingly, the zero-knowledge proving system for JoinSplit instance is also extended to include new constraints for
each new type of JoinSplit spending scenario.
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Table 1: Spending cases based on input and output note types (assume two input notes and two output notes). ×
indicates disallowed scenarios.
Input Types Debt? Output Types Cases
< 0, 0 > No < 0, 0 > Default shielded payment transaction
< 0, 1 > Case 1
< 1, 1 > ×
YES < 0, 0 > Case 3
< 0, 1 > Case 1
< 1, 1 > ×
< 0, 1 > NO < 0, 0 > Case 4
< 0, 1 > Case 4
< 1, 1 > ×
YES < 0, 0 > Case 5 or Case 2
< 0, 1 > Case 2
< 1, 1 > ×
< 1, 1 > NO ×
YES ×
Input Note
0 3 5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Output Note
0 3 5 2 7
1 2 7 0 0
Figure 6: Case 1 transaction example.
OMAP extends note format with new attributes. As a result, it creates multiple JoinSplit spending types. The number
of JoinSplit scenarios depends on, type of each input note (primary or sibling), type of each output note (primary or
sibling), the value of the debt part in input notes (no debt or with debt). With the restriction of two input notes and two
output notes, there are eighteen spending scenarios when ignoring the order of note types. This means that changing
the position of a note within inputs or outputs will not affect the spending scenario (otherwise there will be total of
thirty-two spending scenarios. Of the eighteen spending scenarios, there are eight allowed cases. They are shown in
Table 1. The subsequent discussion provides details of each new spending case, in particular, constraints that must be
satisfied by the zero-knowledge proof.
Default shielded payment transaction: This is the case of the original JoinSplit transaction where one user sends
notes to another user. Its definition is identical to JoinSplit transaction described in the Zcash design.
Exchange initialization: Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice initializes an exchange process. In this case,
the ZK proving algorithm needs to show that the satisfying instance can meet the following constraints in addition to
the requirements common to all JoinSplit transactions. Satisfying conditions for the transaction instance include:

sold1 = s
old
2 = 0
vold1,2 = v
old
2,2 = 0||vold1,2 > 0, vold2,2 = 0||vold1,2 = 0, vold2,2 > 0
snew1 = 0, s
new
2 = 1
vnew1,2 > 0
vnew2,2 = 0
Satisfying conditions determine specific requirements for the input and output notes during a transaction. During proof
generation, it also helps the system to select an appropriate routine (sub arithmetic circuit) to execute. Suppose a note
can be denoted simply as [s, color1, v1, color2, v2]; and Alice creates 5 units of green note (color code: 3) to exchange
7 units of red note (color code: 2) with Bob, we have:
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Input Note
0 3 5 2 7
1 2 7 0 0
Output Note
0 3 3 0 0
0 3 2 0 0
Figure 7: Case 2 transaction example.
Note that output note (sibling note) [1, 2, 7, 0, 0] cannot be spent unless output note [0, 3, 5, 2, 7] is spent already or
spent at the same time. [0, 3, 5, 2, 7] has a negative part where color2 = 2 and v2 = 7. Additional satisfying conditions
for this case, besides the original verification of privacy JoinSplit [24]: When vold1,2 = v
old
2,2 = 0, and the second note is
not a dummy note, the proving algorithm verifies:
colorold1,1 = color
old
2,1 = color
new
1,1
colornew1,2 = color
new
2,1
vnew1,2 = v
new
2,1
vold1,1 + v
old
2,1 = v
new
1,1
When vold1,2 > 0 or v
old
2,2 > 0, the proving algorithm verifies similar sets of satisfying conditions as additional sub-cases
under this transaction scenario.
Either Alice or Bob can spend the created primary note. This means that both of them have access to the same note
spending key. This can be achieved using several approaches. Both can either run a secret sharing protocol offline or
encrypt exchanged messages using each other’s address public key and store ciphertexts on the ledger or as part of the
encrypted memo associated with a note.
Exchange cancellation by the initiator: The initiator, Alice, is free to cancel the swap before the other party takes
actions (the system can enforce that Alice can only cancel after a pre-determined time limit specified as block height
threshold). This is equivalent to the case that Alice starts a second JoinSplit transaction to get her notes back before Bob
does anything. In case of a cancellation transaction, the proving algorithm verifies the following satisfying conditions
for the transaction instance:

sold1 = 0
sold2 = 1
vold1,2 > 0
vold2,2 = 0
(snew1 = 0, s
new
2 = 0, v
new
1,2 = 0, v
new
2,2 = 0 or
snew1 = 0, s
new
2 = 1, v
new
1,2 > 0, v
new
2,2 = 0)
If Alice issues a new transaction to recover 5 units of green note and cancel the exchange, we have:
When vnew1,2 = v
new
2,2 = 0, the proving algorithm verifies the sets of satisfying conditions.
colorold1,2 = color
old
2,1
colornew1,1 = color
new
2,1 = color
old
1,1
vnew1,2 = v
old
2,1
vnew1,1 + v
new
2,1 = v
old
1,1
Similarly, additional transaction sub-cases cover when snew2 = 1 and v
new
1,2 > 0 due to the situation that notes may
change order of positions.
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Input Note
0 3 5 2 7
0 2 9 0 0
Output Note
0 3 5 0 0
0 2 2 0 0
Figure 8: Case 3 transaction example.
Counterparty response with transaction: In order to spend the note that he receives and complete the exchange, Bob
needs to handle the note from Alice with debt. He must spend one of his notes that can cancel out the debt encoded in
the note (both type of asset and amount). The requirement is reflected in the following satisfying conditions by the
proving algorithm for the transaction instance that Bob creates:

sold1 = s
old
2 = s
new
1 = s
new
2 = 0
(vold1,2 > 0, v
old
2,2 = 0||vold1,2 = 0, vold2,2 > 0)
vnew1,2 = 0, v
new
2,2 = 0
In this transaction, Bob receives 5 units of green coins by sending 9 units of red coins in order to finish the exchange
operation:
When vold1,2 > 0 and color
old
1,1 = color
new
1,1 , the proving algorithm verifies:
vold1,1 = v
new
1,1
colorold1,2 = color
old
2,1
colorold2,1 = color
new
2,1
vold1,2 + v
new
2,1 = v
old
2,1
blockn ≤ btold1
The last condition means that Bob can only spend the note before a block height of btold1 . If not, Alice can cancel the
exchange. This prevents the scenario that exchange neither completes nor terminates by a cancellation. The proving
algorithm also needs to verify other sub-cases under this spending scenario when the order of notes changes, e.g.,
when vold1,2 > 0 and color
old
1,1 = color
new
2,1 , etc. After Bob spends, a nullifier will be created and inserted to the pool of
nullifiers and combined Merkle tree, which Alice can use for completing the exchange.
Exchange completion by the initiator: In this scenario, Alice spends after Bob. Alice knows when she can spend by
scanning the pool of nullifiers. When she detects the expected nullifier, she can complete the exchange by creating a
new transaction to spend the matching sibling note. The proving algorithm verifies the following satisfying constraints
by the transaction instance:

sold1 = 1
sold2 = 0
vold1,2 = v
old
2,2 = 0
(snew1 = 0, s
new
2 = 0, v
new
1,2 = 0, v
new
2,2 = 0 or
snew1 = 0, s
new
2 = 1, v
new
1,2 > 0, v
new
2,2 = 0)
Alice completes the exchange with a new transaction:
Note that the first input note can only be spent if there is a matching nullifier for a note already spent by Bob that is the
primary note associated with the first input note (See Case 3 transaction example). Additional satisfying requirements
for this transaction scenario include:
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Input Note
1 2 7 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Output Note
0 2 4 0 0
0 2 3 0 0
Figure 9: Case 4 transaction example.

colorold1,1 = color
old
2,1 = color
new
1,1 = color
new
2,1
vold1,1 + v
old
2,1 = v
new
1,1 + v
new
2,1
blockn > bt
old
1
sold1 = 1
∃notenold3 ∧ (hold3,sig = hold1,sig)
(∃cmold3 with Merkle path (path3, pos3) respect to rt
∧ cmold3 = NoteCommit(nold3 ))
(∃nfold3 with Merkle path (path4, pos4) respect to rt
∧ nfold3 = PRFnfaoldsk,3(ρ
old
3 ))
|pos3− pos1| = 12
Similar to Case 3 transaction, one can set a threshold using block height btold1 to restrict the spending period of the note.
In addition, the proving algorithm needs to verify additional sub-cases of transaction instances such as snew2 = 1 and
vnew1,2 > 0, etc.
Exchange completion by the initiator (a second scenario): In this scenario, Alice spends after Bob to complete the
exchange. The proving algorithm needs to verify the following constraints on input notes and output notes:

colorold1,1 = color
old
2,2 = color
new
1,1
colorold2,1 = color
new
2,1
vold1,1 = v
old
2,2 + v
new
1,1
vold2,1 = v
new
2,1
blockn > bt
old
1
blockn ≤ btold2
∃nold3 ∧ (hold3,sig = hold1,sig)
(∃cmold3 with Merkle path (path3, pos3) respect to rt
∧ cmold3 = NoteCommit(nold3 ))
(∃nfold3 with Merkle path (path4, pos4) respect to rt
∧ nfold3 = PRFnfaoldsk,3(ρ
old
3 ))
|pos3− pos1| = 1
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Input Note
1 2 7 0 0
0 3 1 2 5
Output Note
0 2 2 0 0
0 3 1 0 0
Figure 10: Case 5 transaction example.
Additional conditions that need to be satisfied by this scenario: When snew1 = s
new
2 = v
new
1,2 = 0, the proving algorithm
needs to verify: 
sold1 = 1
sold2 = 0
vold1,2 = 0
vold2,2 > 0
snew1 = 0, s
new
2 = 0, v
new
1,2 = 0, v
new
2,2 = 0
7 Security Model and Analysis
In this paper, the described OMAP protocol for supporting the oblivious and fair exchange of privacy digital assets is
based on extending data models and transaction definitions of Zcash protocol. It achieves fair and privacy-preserving
exchange through orchestrated payment transactions. Since the OMAP algorithms are within the Zcash framework, most
of the properties shown in Zcash and related publications still hold for OMAP [13,27,30,31], for instance, completeness.
The security proofs for Zcash are mostly applicable to OMAP with trivial extensions. Here the discussions focus
on properties or requirements unique to the proposed exchange protocol. Note that it is assumed that the underlying
distributed ledger system to support consensus and network communications is assumed to be secure and reliable,
which is outside the scope of OMAP. We further assume that measures are taken to prevent attacks that may happen at
different layers. Such attacks include but not limited to, for instance, 51% attack, privacy compromise through analysis
of network traffic patterns, attack to DNS, hard forks, quantum attack, etc. In addition, we assume that the underlying
zero knowledge proving system is secure.
7.1 Requirements
The original Zcash privacy coin defines security as: ledger indistinguishability, transaction non-malleability, and
balance.
Ledger indistinguishability: ledger L reveals no information to the adversaryA beyond publicly disclosed information.
Transaction non-malleability: no bounded adversary A can alter any of the data stored within a valid transaction. It
prevents the adversary from modifying others’ transactions before they are added to the ledger.
Balance: no bounded adversary A can own more notes than what he minted or received via transactions from others.
Specific to OMAP, we define the following security requirements:
• Fairness. When users agree to conduct an exchange of assets, represented as privacy notes that support multiple
asset types, the operation leads to two possibilities: it fails that each one still has his/her note (asset), or it
succeeds that each one possesses the other’s note (asset type and amount). In other word, the exchange either
completes or aborts.
• Privacy. Though all transaction information is stored on the decentralized ledger, other users should not be
able to learn any useful information about the exchange transaction. For payment, Zcash is already shown to
meet the requirement of transaction indistinguishability. OMAP extends JoinSplit transaction with multiple
2The conditions guarantee that note commitment cmold3 is the neighbor of its sibling/pairing note′ commitment cmold1 .
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spending cases. Therefore, transaction indistinguishability is extended to cover the requirement that, no
bounded adversary A can distinguish different scenarios of JoinSplit transactions. This means that OMAP
ledger reveals no information to the adversary A of transactions so that A can tell if a JoinSplit transaction is a
regular payment, exchange initialization, exchange cancellation, etc.
• Balance. No bounded adversary A can own more notes than what he minted, or received via direct payment
from others or via exchange.
7.2 Analysis
Next, we show that the constructed scheme satisfies all the features defined above, including, fairness, indistinguishabil-
ity, and balance.
Fairness: This property requires that after an exchange is initiated, it either completes or aborts. At a high level, OMAP
achieves fairness by reducing this requirement to assurance that double spending can be detected and prevented by
the underlying ledger. According to OMAP, to start an exchange, Alice creates a pair of notes (one primary note and
one sibling note). The primary note is shared between Alice and Bob, so either one of them can spend. If fairness
is not satisfied, this means that the system reaches a state that either both Alice and Bob succeeded in spending the
primary note; or none of them can spend the primary note. For the first case, it is clear that it is equivalent to double
spending and is prohibited by the consensus mechanism of the underlying ledger. For the second case, if neither Alice
nor Bob has spent the primary note yet, then one of them can spend in the future. In case, there is a time limit, Alice
can eventually spend the primary note, which terminates the exchange operation. The likelihood that someone else
besides Alice and Bob spends the primary note is negligible and ensured by the security of the base protocol. Therefore,
one can conclude, that with probability 1-negl, the exchange will either succeed or terminate.
Privacy: In OMAP, the exchange is achieved through multiple JoinSplit transactions (shielded to shielded payment
transactions). Although OMAP defines multiple JoinSplit transaction scenarios, there is only one combined circuit for
proving ZK satisfiability of a JoinSplit transaction instance. This guarantees that different JoinSplit spending cases
within an exchange operation or between exchange operations or between an exchange operation and regular payment
should be indistinguishable. They are different ZK satisfying instances of the same proving circuit. If an adversary A
can break the indistinguishability property, it means that A can distinguish different proofs, which contradicts to the
assumption that the underlying zero-knowledge proving system is secure.
Balance: This requires that no bounded adversary A can own more notes than what he receives via direct payment or
an exchange. Note that OMAP implements fair exchange using JoinSplit payment transactions. The original Zcash
protocol already shows that the balance requirement is satisfied by JoinSplit transactions. OMAP introduces sibling
note. Somehow, the asset in a sibling note can be viewed as borrowed from the system. A sibling note cannot be spent
by itself. According to JoinSplit algorithm, the condition to spend a sibling note is that either the associated primary
note is spent already or it is spent together with the paired primary note in a JoinSplit transaction. This guarantees
balance during the exchange operation. Assume that adversary A can spend a sibling note itself independent of the
associated primary note. According to the OMAP JoinSplit ZK proof algorithm, this means that the adversary A must
find another primary note with matching sequence number S. For a pair of primary note and sibling note, S is created
by a CRH using input value unique to the transaction. If adversary A can spend a sibling note by pairing it with another
note, it means that adversary A can break the CRH by finding a collision, which contradicts the assumption that CRH is
collision resistant.
8 Conclusion
Exchanging different types of crypto assets on distributed ledger/ blockchain is a natural extension of privacy-preserving
cryptocurrency systems. In response to this demand, we develop a novel multi-asset and privacy protected asset
exchange framework on blockchain and apply zero-knowledge proof to enhance privacy protection for exchange
operations.
In addition, we discuss the implementation of the unified zero-knowledge proving system used to support both payment
transactions and multi-asset exchanges with privacy; and a formal definition of oblivious and privacy-preserving
exchange scheme on the public ledger.
We extend the data formats and proving system of existing privacy coin to support the designed protocol. We have so
far implemented circuits for handling extension and different payment spending scenarios in order to support fair asset
exchanges using libsnark library. Furthermore, many new zero-knowledge proving systems are proposed recently, our
current work includes experimenting and porting the scheme to zero-knowledge proving systems such as zk-STARK [32]
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and Bulletproofs [26]. Different from zk-SNARK, recent schemes (e.g., Bulletproofs) do not require a security setup.
Implementing our multi-asset and oblivious exchange protocol over these new zero-knowledge proving systems may
help increase both trustworthiness and performance of the proposed protocol.
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